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The effect of a partial explanation as additional information in the learning 
process is investigated. A scientist performs experiments to gather experimental 
data about some phenomenon, and then tries to construct an explanation (or 
theory) for the phenomenon. A plausible model for the practice of science is an 
inductive inference machine (scientist) learning a program (explanation) from a 
graph (set of experiments) of a recursive function (phenomenon). It is argued that 
this model of science is not an adequate one, as scientists, in addition to performing 
experiments, make use of some approximate partial explanation based on the “state 
of the art” knowledge about that phenomenon. An attempt has been made to model 
this partial explanation as additional information in the scientilic process. It is 
shown that the inference capability of machines is improved in the presence of such 
a partial explanation. The quality of this additional information is modeled 
using certain “density” notions. It is shown that additional information about a 
“better” quality partial explanation enhances the inference capability of learning 
machines as scientists more than a “not so good” partial explanation. Similar 
enhancements to inference of approximations, a more sophisticated model of science, 
are demonstrated. Inadequacies in Gold’s paradigm of language learning are 
investigated. It is argued that Gold’s model fails to incorporate certain additional 
information that children get from their environment. Children are sometimes told 
about some grammatical rule that enumerates elements of the language. It is argued 
that these rules are a kind of additional information. They enable children to see 
in advance elements that are yet to appear in their environments. Also, children are 
being given some information about what is not in the language. Sometimes, they 
are rebuked for making incorrect utterances, or are told of a rule that enumerates 
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certain non-elements of the language. An attempt has been made to extend Gold’s 
model to incorporate both the above types of additional information. It is shown 
that either type of additional information enhances the learning capability of formal 
language learning devices. 0 1991 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the scenario in which a subject is attempting to learn “its” 
environment. At any given time, the subject receives a finite piece of data 
about its environment, and based upon this finite information, conjectures 
an explanation about the environment. The subject is said to learn its 
environment just in case the explanations conjectured by the subject 
become fixed over time, and this fixed explanation is a correct representa- 
tion of the subject’s environment. Computational learning theory provides 
a framework for the study of the above scenario when the subject is an 
algorithmic machine. This paper argues that a subject, in a number of 
learning situations, has some partial explanation about its environment as 
additional information. We introduce various formulations of this partial 
explanation and investigate the impact of providing such an additional 
information on the learning capability of algorithmic devices. The two 
learning situations investigated are the practice of science and language 
acquisition. 
Picture a scientist performing all possible experiments (in arbitrary 
order) associated with a phenomenon, noting the result of each experiment, 
while simultaneously, but algorithmically, conjecturing a succession of 
candidate explanations for the phenomenon. A criterion of success is that 
the scientist eventually conjectures an explanation which he/she never gives 
up, and this final explanation correctly predicts the results of every experi- 
ment about the phenomenon. The set of all pairs of the form (experiment, 
corresponding result) associated with the phenomenon can be taken to be 
coded by a function from N to N, where N is the set of natural numbers. 
If the ever experimenting scientist in the above scenario is replaced by a 
machine, then algorithmic identification in the limit of a program for a 
recursive function from its graph serves as a plausible model for the prac- 
tice of science. This is essentially the theme of inductive inference studied 
by Gold (1967). A machine M Ex-identifies a function iff (by definition) the 
scientist is replaced by machine M in the above scenario for success. Ex is 
defined to be the class of sets Y of recursive functions such that some 
machine Ex-identifies each recursive function in Y. 
We feel that the above model of science is somewhat inadequate. For one 
thing, a scientist has more information available than just the result of 
experiments. For another, the result of a scientist’s investigation need not 
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be a final theory. C. S. Peirce (1958; see also Reilly, 1970) argues that 
science is a non-terminating process of successive approximations. Finally, 
a scientist might have some partial explanation of the phenomenon based 
on “state of the art” knowledge about that phenomenon and probably uses 
this additional information in coming up with an explanation. The model 
described above does not take into account the presence of this additional 
information. In the present paper, we attempt to model this additional 
information. 
Our approach to modeling a scientist’s knowledge of partial explanations 
is described thus. We require a learning machine to be presented with any 
program which computes a partial recursive function that (1) agrees suf- 
ficiently (infinitely often) with the function being learned and (2) does not 
contradict the function being learned. In other words, a machine learning 
a function f is fed, in addition to a graph off, a program that computes 
an infinite subset off as additional information. For a number of function 
inference criteria, we show that such additional information enhances the 
learning capability of machines. 
We model the quality of partial explanations using certain “density” 
notions due to Royer (1986). Intuitively, a good partial explanation has, in 
some sense, greater agreement with the function being learned than a not so 
good partial explanation. We show that a better quality partial explanation 
enhances the function inference capability of machines more than a not so 
good partial explanation. 
The restriction that the partial function computed by the additional 
information program not contradict the function being learned, we feel, 
makes our approach a simplistic one, as there is no reason to believe that 
the state of the art partial explanation available to a scientist has only 
errors of omission and no errors of commission. 
An idea related to “scientific” inference of functions is Gold’s seminal 
notion of identification (Gold, 1967). We will refer to it as TxtEx-identifica- 
tion following Case and Lynes (1982). In the following, a language is a 
recursively enumerable (r.e.) set, and a grammar (type 0) for a language is 
a program that enumerates the language (Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979) in 
some fixed acceptable programming system (Rogers, 1958, 1967; Machtey 
and Young, 1978). 
According to Gold’s paradigm, a child (modeled as a machine) receives 
(in arbitrary order) all the well-defined strings of a language (a text for the 
language), and simultaneously conjectures a succession of candidate gram- 
mars for the language being received. A criterion of success is for the child 
to eventually conjecture a correct grammar and to never change its conjec- 
ture thereafter. A machine M TxtEx-identifies a language iff (by definition) 
the child is replaced by machine M in the above scenario for success. 
Machine M is often called a language learning machine. TxtEx is defined 
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to be the class of sets 3 of r.e. languages such that some machine 
TxtEx-identifies each language in 2. 
Additional information, in the context of language learning, is modeled 
as a grammar for any infinite subset of the language being learned. Such an 
additional information to a language learning machine is justified, as it is 
not uncommon for an elder person (a parent or a teacher) to tell a child 
some small grammatical rule that enables the child to enumerate a list of 
elements of the language. Basically, this additional information, in the form 
of a grammatical rule, enables the child to know certain elements of the 
language before these elements actually appear in the child’s text. 
It turns out that this kind of additional information, henceforth 
referred to as positive additional information, indeed increases the learning 
power of language learning machines. We further model the quality of 
positive additional information by measuring the “density of agreement” 
between the language being learned and the subset language whose 
grammar is provided as additional information. Nor surprisingly, “better 
quality” positive additional information enhances the learning capability of 
language learning devices more than “not so good” positive additional 
information. 
Gold’s paradigm is based on the assumption that children are rarely 
informed of their grammatical errors. However, there are studies that refute 
this assumption (Brown and Bellugi, 1964; Dale, 1976). It is plausible that 
children are receiving some information about the complement of the 
language. A rebuke from an elder person for any ungrammatical utterance 
may act as a clue to a child about the absence of certain strings from the 
language. Better still, the elder person may provide the child with a rule 
that enumerates some ungrammatical strings in the language. We model 
such an additional information about what is not in the language by 
providing a language learning machine with any grammar that generates a 
subset of the complement of the language being learned. We refer to such 
additional information as negative additional information, and show that 
even negative additional information enhances the learning capability of 
language learning devices. We model the quality of negative additional 
information by measuring the density of agreement between the comple- 
ment of the language being learned and the subset of the complement 
language whose grammar is provided as additional information. Even in 
this case, we show that a better quality negative additional information 
enhances the learning power of language learning devices more than a not 
so good negative additional information. 
Finally, we consider language learning scenarios in which a machine is 
provided with both positive additional information and negative additional 
information. 
In the present work, we are concerned with extending TxtEx-identilica- 
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tion and Ex-identification by providing additional information to the 
learning machine. We briefly note other attempts to extending these 
fundamental learning paradigms. Blum and Blum (1975) and Case and 
Smith (1983), in the context of function inference, consider the case where 
the program inferred by the learning machine is allowed to make a finite 
number of mistakes. For language learning, Case and Lynes (1982) and 
Osherson and Weinstein (1982a, b) consider learning criteria in which the 
grammar inferred is allowed to be a grammar for a finite variant of the 
language being learned. Smith (1982) considers the function inference 
criteria in which the learning machine is replaced by a “team” of learning 
machines and successful learning takes place if any one member of the team 
succeeds in learning the language. Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein (1986a) 
consider a generalized notion of team learning. Pitt (1984) has shown that 
the power of probabilistic machines can be neatly characterized in terms of 
teams (Smith, 1982) of deterministic machines. Jain and Sharma (1990b) 
consider team inference in the context of language learning. Royer (1986) 
and Smith and Velauthapillai (1986) consider the case where the inferred 
program may have infinitely many anomalies, but the “density” of these 
anomalies is bounded. Recently, Case (1988) has considered language 
learning criteria in which the learning agent is allowed to converge in the 
limit to a finite set of grammars instead of one. Case, Jain, and Sharma 
(1989) consider grammar size restrictions in Case’s vacillating language 
learning criteria (Case, 1988). Fulk (1985, 1990a) and Jain and Sharma 
(1989) consider other forms of additional information to learning 
machines. 
2. NOTATION 
Any unexplained recursion theoretic notation is from Rogers (1967). N 
denotes the set of natural numbers, (0, 1, 2, 3, . ..}. N + denotes the set of 
positive integers, { 1, 2, 3, . ..}. Unless otherwise specified, i, j, k, 1, m, n, with 
or without decorations, range over N. * denotes any finite number which 
is not prespecified. a, b, and c, with or without decorations, range over 
(N u { * }). a denotes the empty set. G denotes subset. c denotes proper 
subset. S, with or without decorations, ranges over subsets of N. 
card(S) denotes the cardinality of the set S. max, min denote the maximum 
and minimum of a set, respectively. For n E N and any two sets S, 
and Sz, S1 =” S, means card((S, - S,) u (S, - S,)) <n; S, =* S2 means 
card((S, - S,) u (S, - S,)) is finite. 
q and 8 range over partial functions with arguments and values from N. 
f ranges over total functions with arguments and values from N. For n E N 
and partial functions v] and 0, q =‘I 8 means that card( (x 1 v](x) # e(x)}) 6 n; 
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q =* 0 means that card( {x 1 q(x) #e(x)}) is finite. domain(q) and range(q) 
denote the domain and range of the function 9, respectively. For a set S, 
q(S) = i means for all x E S, r](x) = i. 
L, with or without decorations, ranges over subsets of N, usually 
construed as a language. & denotes the class of all recursively enumerable 
(r.e.) languages. 6p, with or without decorations, ranges over subsets of b, 
i.e., ~2 is used to denote a class of r.e. languages. L denotes the complement 
of L, i.e., E= N - L. 
cp denotes a standard acceptable programming system (Rogers, 1958, 
1967; Machtey and Young, 1978). 0 denotes an arbitrary Blum complexity 
measure (Blum, 1967; Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979) for the q-system. cp, 
denotes the partial computable function computed by program i in the 
p-system. W, = domain( Wf = {x 6 SI Gi(-x) d s}. The set of all total 
recursive functions of one variable is denoted by 2. z?‘, %?, with or without 
decoration, range over subsets of W. (i,j) stands for an arbitrary com- 
putable one to one encoding of all pairs of natural numbers onto N 
(Rogers, 1967) (we assume that (i,j)>max({i,j))). ScN is called 
single-valued just in case {(x, y) 1 (x, y) ES) represents a function. A 
single-valued set is said to be single-valued total just in case the function 
it represents is total. For m and no N, [m, n] (respectively, [m, n), 
(m, n], and [m, co)) generally denotes {XE N 1 m < x < PZ} (respectively, 
(x~Nlm<x<n}, {xENlm<xBn}, and {xENlm<x}), although 
sometimes [m, n], (m, n], and [m, n) denote the corresponding interval 
in the real numbers. It will be clear from context which of these meanings 
is intended. Variable d, with or without decorations, ranges over real 
numbers in the real interval [0, 11. 
The quantifiers “V cc” and “El”,” essentially from Blum (1967), mean “for 
all but finitely many” and “there exist infinitely many,” respectively. The 
quantifier “I!” denotes “there exists a unique.” 0 denotes the end of proof 
of a claim or a proposition; 1 denotes the end of proof of a theorem. 
3. FUNCTION INFERENCE 
3.1. Fundamental Function Inference Paradigms 
An Inductive Inference Machine (IIM) (Gold, 1967) is an algorithmic 
device which takes as its input a set of data given one element at a time, 
and which from time to time, as it is receiving its input, outputs programs. 
IIMs have been used in the study of machine identification of programs for 
recursive functions as well as algorithmic learning of grammars for 
languages (Blum and Blum, 1975; Case and Smith, 1983; Chen, 1981; Fulk, 
1985; Gold, 1967; Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein, 1986b; Wiehagen, 1978). 
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For a survey of this work see [Angluin and Smith (1983), Osherson, Stob, 
and Weinstein (1986b), Klette and Wiehagen (1980), and Case (1986)]. 
M, with or without decorations, ranges over the class of inductive 
inference machines. For inference of a recursive function f by an IIM M, 
graph off is fed to M in any order. Without loss of generality (Blum and 
Blum, 1975; Case and Smith, 1983) we will assume that M is fed the graph 
of f in the sequence (0, f(O)), (1, f( 1)) (2, f(2)), . . . . For all recursive 
functions f, f In denotes the finite initial segment ((0, f (0)), (1, f (1 )), . . . . 
(n, f(n))). Variables 0 and t, with or without decorations, range over finite 
initial segments. M(a) is the last output of M after input g is received (note 
that (T can be encoded as a natural number). We will assume, without loss 
of generality, that M(o) is always defined. We say that M(f) converges to 
i (written: M(f )I = i) iff (V”n)[M(fl”) = i]; M(f) is undefined otherwise. 
DEFINITION 1 (Gold, 1967; Blum and Blum, 1975; Case and Smith, 
1983). Suppose a E N u { *}. 
(a) M Exn-identifies a recursive function f (written: f EEx”(M)) iff 
both M(f)1 and qMcr, =“f: 
(b) Ex”= {~L%?~(~M)[Y~Ex~(M)]}. 
Case and Smith (1983) introduced another infinite hierarchy of iden- 
tification criteria which we describe below. “Be” stands for behaviorally 
correct. Barzdin (1974) independently introduced a similar notion. 
DEFINITION 2 (Case and Smith, 1983). Suppose UE N u {*}. 
(a) M Bc”-identifies a recursive function f (written: f E Be”(M)) iff M, 
fedf, outputs over time an infinite sequence of programs pO, p,, pZ, . . . such 
that (V”” n)[q,, =“f 1. 
(b) Be”= {Y4pE\((3M)[Y~Bea(M)]). 
We usually write Ex for Exe and Be for Be’. Theorem 1 just below states 
some of the basic hierarchy results about the Ex” and Be” classes. 
THEOREM 1. For all n E N, 
(a) Ex”cEx”+‘; 
(b) lJnsN Ex”c Ex*; 
(c) Ex* cBc; 
(d) Be”cBe”+‘; 
(e) UneN Bc” c Bc *; and 
(f) gEE*. 
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Parts (a), (b), (d), and ( e are due to Case and Smith (1983). John Steel ) 
first observed that Ex* c Bc and part (c) is due to Case and Smith (1983). 
Part (f) is due to Harrington (Case and Smith, 1983). Blum and Blum 
(1975) first showed that Ex c Ex*. Barzdin (1974) independently showed 
Ex c Bc. 
3.2. Additional Information for Function Inference 
We define the following notions of “density” from Royer (1986). Similar 
notions were also used by Smith and Velauthapillai (1986) in the context 
of inductive inference. 
DEFINITION 3 (S. Tennenbaum; see Rogers, 1967, p. 156, and Royer, 
1986). (a) Suppose that A c N and that B is a finite, nonempty subset 
of N. We define the density of A in B (denoted: d(A; B)) as card(A A B)/ 
card(B). 
(b) The density of a set A (denoted: d(A)) is lim,,,inf({d(A; 
{zlz<x))lx>n}). 
Intuitively, d(A; B) can be thought of as the probability of selecting an 
element of A when choosing an arbitrary element from B. 
We now describe our notion of additional information to an inductive 
inference machine learning a program from the graph of a recursive func- 
tion. An IIM, trying to infer a program for a recursive functionf, is given 
as additional information, a program for a partial recursive function 4 
which agrees withf to some extent. In Definition 4 just below, we precisely 
define what we mean by “a partial funcion g agrees withf to some extent.” 
DEFINITION 4. Suppose d is a real number in the interval [0, 11. A par- 
tial function v] is said to be d-conforming with a total function f iff q satisfies 
the following two conditions: 
(1) q of, i.e., q does not contradict f; and 
(2) d(domain(q)) > d. 
Using Definition 4, we define below our new learning criterion for iden- 
tification of a program from graph of a recursive function in the presence 
of a partial explanation. In the following definition, Ap stands for 
Approximate partial additional information. 
DEFINITION 5. Suppose d is a real number in the interval [0, 11. 
Suppose aE N u {*}. 
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(a) A machine M Apd ExO-identifies a recursive function f (written: 
feApd Ex”(M)) iff M, fed f and any program p such that ‘pP is 
d-conforming withf, converges in the limit to a program i such that (pi =“f: 
(b) ApdEx”= {9%4?~((3M)[Y’4~Ap~Ex~(M)]). 
We similarly define the corresponding identification criterion for Be 
inference. 
DEFINITION 6. Suppose d is a real number in the interval [0, 11. 
Suppose a~ N u {*}. 
(a) A machine M Apd Fk”-identifies a recursive function f (written: 
fe Apd Be”(M)) iff M, fed f and any program p such that (pP is 
d-conforming with f, outputs an infinite sequence of programs pO, pl, p2, . . . 
such that (V”n)[p,” =“f]. 
(b) ApdBc”= {9’~92j((3M)[Y~Ap~Bc”(M)]}. 
In the above identification criteria, (pP, an approximation to f, is good 
plausible additional information to a machine trying to learn a program for 
f from a graph off: However, ‘pP may be a very bad approximator locally 
for large intervals which may be of importance. To overcome this situation, 
we use the notion of “uniform density” from Royer (1986) to define a new 
identification criterion. 
DEFINITION 7 (Royer, 1986). The uniform density of a set A in intervals 
of length an (denoted ud,(A)) is inf{(d(A; {z~x<z~y})~x,y~N and 
y-x2n)). U y nz orm density of A (denoted ud(A)) is lim,,, ud,(A). 
Using the notion of uniform density we define an improved learning 
criterion. Definition 8 just below is an analogous notion to Definition 4 for 
this new density notion. 
DEFINITION 8. Suppose d is a real number in the interval [0, 11. A 
partial function rl is said to be d-uniform conforming with a total function 
f iff q satisfies the following two conditions: 
(1) q of, i.e., v does not contradict f; and 
(2) ud(domain(q)) 2 d. 
In the following definition, UAp stands for Uniform Approximate partial 
additional information. 
DEFINITION 9. Suppose d is a real number in the interval [0, 11. 
Suppose UE N u {*}. 
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(a) A machine M UApd Ex”-icientifies a recursive function f (written: 
f~ UApd Ex”(M)) iff M, fedf and any program p such that (pP is d-uniform 
conforming withf, converges in the limit to a program i such that (~;=~f: 
(b) UApdEx”= {9%E~((3M)[9%UApdExu(M)]). 
We similarly define the corresponding identification criterion for I!k 
inference. 
DEFINITION 10. Suppose d is a real number in the interval [0, 11. 
Suppose UE N u (*). 
(a) A machine M UApd Bc”-identifies a recursive function f (written: 
fe UApd Be”(M)) iff M, fedfand any program p such that ‘pP is d-uniform 
conforming with f, outputs an infinite sequence of programs pO, pl, p2, . . . 
such that (V”‘n)[q,, =“f]. 
(b) UApdBc”= {Yc_a((~M)[~c_UApdBc”(M)]). 
In what follows, we will refer to the two types of additional information 
as Ap and UAp type. Intuitively, UAp type additional information is a 
better kind of additional information; hence, we could expect the corre- 
sponding criteria of identification to be more general. Since any UApd type 
additional information is also an Apd additional information, we have the 
following two propositions. 
PROPOSITION 1. (VIE N u {*})(V~E [0, l])(ApdEx”cUApdEx”]. 
PROPOSITION 2. (VUE N u {*})(V~E [0, l])(ApdBc”~UApdBc”]. 
The following theorems deal with the trade-offs between anomalies in the 
conjectured program, additional information, and types of identification 
criteria. 
THEOREM 2. (Vde (0, l])(Vm E N)[UApd Ex - Ap’ BP # 01. 
Theorem 2 says that there are classes of recursive functions that can be 
Ex-identified with some UAp type additional information of non-zero 
density, but cannot be Bc-identified with any predetermined number of 
anomalies allowed per program and even the best possible Ap type addi- 
tional information. In other words, the best possible Ap type additional 
information and a more general criterion of inference cannot, in general, 
compensate for any UAp type additional information of non-zero density. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let N, = 0. For i >, 0, let NZi+, = Nzi + i + 1 and 
N2i+2=N2i+l *2’. Let Sj denote the set lJksN [N2r<j,k)r NZl<j,k)+,). 
Consider the following class of functions: 
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$? = {f E $&! 1 the following conditions hold: 
“f(UicN CN*I+13 N2i+2))=” 
2~~v~~x~~~~CxE~jA~ESjl~Cf~X~~f~~~ll 
1 
CLAIM 1. (Vm E N)[%Y$ Ap’Bc”]. 
Proof of Claim 1. Consider the following function q: 
XEUiEN CN2i+,, N,i+*)i 
otherwise. 
It is easy to see that (V~~V)[d({xIq(x)=f(x)})= 11. Suppose by way 
of contradiction that machine M, with a program for q as the additional 
information, BP-identities all f in %?. It is, then, easy to convert M to M’ 
such that M’ Be”‘-identifies all recursive functions. To see this, for a function 
f, detinef’ as follows: 
f’(x)={f;) if XEU;,N CNZi+12 N2if2); if xESj. 
Let Y = {f’If~.4?}. Clearly, [VEA~‘BC”‘] a [YE AplBcm] =a 
[YE Bc”] + [a EBP]. But 9 $ Be” (Case and Smith, 1983). Thus, no 
such machine M exists that Ap’ BP-identifies 9. 0 
CLAIM 2. (Vd~(0, 1])[%7~UAp~Ex]. 
Proof of Claim 2. Consider machine M which, on additional informa- 
tion program s, outputs a program P(s) described as follows: 
if XE UkeN GNx+~~ Nx+z) 
then 
output 0 
else 
let j be such that x E Sj; 
search for y such that y E Sj A cp,(y)J; 
when such a y is found output q,(y) 
endif 
end {(~~dx)l 
It is easy to see that if a program s for qs is additional information of 
type UAp”, d > 0, for f~ V, then, for all j, there exists a y such that y E Sj 
and qJy)l. Thus, ‘pPcsj =f: 0 [Theorem 21 1 
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As a contrast to Theorem 2 above, Theorem 3 below says that there are 
classes of recursive functions that can be Ex-identified with Ap type addi- 
tional information but cannot be R-identified with any predetermined 
number of anomalies and UAp type additional information if the density 
associated with Ap type additional information is better than the one 
associated with UAp type additional information. 
THEOREM 3. (Vd,>d,/d,,d,~[O,l])(Vl~~)[Ap~*Ex-UApdlBc’#@]. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Without loss of generality, let d, = (m + 3)/n and 
dl=m/n, where m+3<n and m,nEkJ. Let N,=-1 and Nj=ni. Let S, 
denote the set ukEN (N,,,,, N<j,kj+,]. Let S,!=S,n {xlx>mmodn}. 
Consider the class %? of recursive functions defined below. 
59 = {f E 9 1 the following conditions hold: 
l.(Vx)[[x<mmodn]*[f(x)=O]] 
2. b!Lwm=q ~Y~~/1~Ef(X)=fcY)ll 
1 
CLAIM 3. (V~EN)[%?$LJA~~~ Bck]. 
Proof of Claim 3. Let q be such that q(x) = 0 if x < m mod n and v](x) 
is undefined otherwise. Clearly, any program for q is an UApd’ additional 
information for all f E Q?. Now proceeding in the same way as in Claim 1 
in Theorem 2, we have that V 4 UApdl Bck. 0 
CLAIM 4. V E Apd2 Ex. 
Proof of Claim 4. Consider machine M, which on additional infor- 
mation program s outputs a program P(s), defined as follows: 
begin bp,&)> 
if (x-cmmodn) 
then 
output 0 
else 
let j be such that x E S,!; 
search for y E S,! such that cp,(y)l; 
when such a y is found output q,(y) 
endif 
end bp&4~ 
Let program s for cps be additional information of type Apd2 for f E $7. 
Now for large enough i, card({xlx,<N, A cp,(x)=f(x)})/(N,+ 1)2 
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(m + 2)/n. Since Nip ,/Ni= l/n, there exists a y, Ni_. 1 < y 6 Ni and 
y 3 m mod n, such that cp,( y)J. Thus, (P~,~) = jI 0 i [Theorem 33 
THEOREM 4. (VIE N) 
(1) Ex’+’ - UAp’ Ex’# 0. 
(2) Bc’+’ - UAp’ Bc’# a. 
(3) Ex*- ui UAp’ Ex’f @. 
(4) Bc - UAp’ Ex* # (25. 
Proof of Theorem 4. For all f~ &?, let f’ be detined as follows: 
f’(x) = i’ay’ if (3y)[2’= x]; 
otherwise. 
For any class of functions G?Y, let %?’ = {f’ 1 f E gl. It is easy to see that 
for all UEN u {*}, %?EEx “~WEEX“OWEUA~~EX~ and %?~Btfo 
+?’ E Bc” o %’ E UAp’ Bc”. 
Theorem 4 follows from the results in Case and Smith (1983) (see 
Theorem 1). 1 [Theorem 41 
The above theorems give the complete relationship between different Ex 
and Be identification criteria formed with both Ap and UAp type addi- 
tional information. We observe some of these relationships in Corollary 1 
below which follows from results presented in this section and Theorem 1. 
COROLLARY 1. Let dl, d,E [0, 11. Let a, be N u {*}. 
(a) Apd’ Ex” c Apd2 Exb o [d, < d2 and a d b]. 
(b) Apd1Bc”~Apd2Bcbo[[b=*] or [dl<d,andu<b]] 
(c) UApd’ Ex” E UApd2 Exb o (Id, 6 d, and a < b]. 
(d) UApdl Bc” G UAp” Bcb o [[b = *] or [d, < d2 and a < b]]. 
(e) (VdE (0, l])[Apd Ex” c UApd Ex”]. 
(f) (Vdo(0, l])(Vi~ N)[ApdBcicUApdBci]. 
3.3. Additional Information for Approximate Function Inference 
Royer (1986) provides criticism of Ex” and Ex* criteria as models of 
science. They are too strict to reflect how anomalies occur in actual 
scientific theories. Case (1986) criticizes the Ex* criterion as being too 
impractical because under this criterion one can converge to an explana- 
tion for a phenomenon which is almost everywhere correct, but which is 
still incorrect on predicting all the experiments which one would care 
about. To address these issues, Royer (1986) considered the inductive 
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inference criteria which permit infinitely many errors in explanations, but 
which require that the “density” of these errors be no more than a certain 
prespecitied amount. Smith and Velauthapillai (1986) also investigated 
similar criteria of inference. We investigate the effect of a partial explana- 
tion on such criteria. The following definitions are from Royer (1986). Also, 
see Smith and Velauthapillai (1986) for similar notions. 
DEFINITION 11. (a) (Royer, 1986) The asymptotic agreement between 
two partial functions q and 6 (denoted aa(q, 0)) is d( {xl q(x) = e(x)}). 
(b) (Rose and Ullman, 1963; Royer, 1986) The asymptotic disugree- 
ment between two partial functions g and 0 (denoted ad(q, 0)) is 
1 - aa(q, 0). 
DEFINITION 12 (Royer, 1986). Let de [0, 11. 
(a) A machine M Aexd-identifies a recursive function f (written 
f E Aexd(M)) iff M(f )J = i and ad(f, cp,) 6 d. 
(b) Aex”= {%?GB[((~M)[WL:A~~~(M)]}. 
DEFINITION 13. (Royer, 1986). (a) The asymptotic uniform agreement 
between two partial functions 11 and 0 (denoted aua(q, 0)) is 
uWxIv(x)=@))). 
(b) The asymptotic uniform disagreement between two partial 
functions q and 0 (denoted aud(r], 0)) is 1 - aua(q, 0). 
DEFINITION 14 (Royer, 1986). Let dE [0, 11. 
(a) A machine M UAexd-identifies a recursive function f (written 
f E UAexd(M)) iff M(f )J = i and aud(f, cp,) d d. 
(b) UAexd= {%?~L%?~(~M)[VGUA~~~(M)]}. 
The above criteria can be extended to identification with addi- 
tional information to give Apdl Aexd2, Apdl UAexd2, UApd’ Aex” and 
UApdl UAex” criteria of identification. 
Royer showed the following result about Aex-identification. 
THEOREM 5 (Royer, 1986). (Vde [0, l))[.%?$Aexd]. 
PROPOSITION 3. (Vde [0, l])[B?~Ap~Aex’-“1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. A machine which just outputs the additional 
information program given to it Apd Aex’ ~ d-identities 9. 0 
PROPOSITION 4. (VdE [0, 1])[9~UAp~UAex’~~]. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. A machine which just outputs the additional 
information program given to it UApd UAex’ -d-identiIies 92. 0 
The following theorems give the relationship between different criteria of 
approximate identification with additional information. 
THEOREM 6. 
(Vd, > O)(Vd,, d3 ( d2 + d3 < l)[UApdl Ex - Apd2 Aexd3 # a]. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Without loss of generality, assume that dI = 2/n, 
d*=Z/n, d,=(n-f-1)/n, n>l, where Z,nEN. Let N,,=O, Nzi+l= 
n if1+N2i, and N,i+2= N2+l+(j+l)*n. Let Sj=Ukczft4 CN2*<j,k)+lY 
N 2 * <j,k) + *). Consider the following class of functions: 
V = {f G B 1 the following conditions hold: 
l.f({Ui,N CNZi,Nzi+I))n(xIx<Emodn})=O 
2. (v~)CCxEsjl * Cf(x)=f(~)ll 
> 
To UApd’ Ex-identify f, M, on additional information, program s for cps 
outputs a program P(s) described as follows: 
search for y E S, such that cp,(y)l; 
when such a y is found output q,(y) 
end h&)~ 
It is easy to see that if, when f~ %‘, cps is additional information of type 
UApd’, where d, = 2/n, then for all x there exists a y E S, such that cp,(y)J. 
Thus (up = f: 
Let 4 be defined as follows: 
v(x) = 
i 
0 Cx<lmdnl A lIXEUi,N CNZi,Nzi+1)1; 
t otherwise. 
It is easy to see that (Vf~%)[d({xlq(x)=f(x)})=l/n]. Suppose by way 
of contradiction that a machine M Apd2 Aex“‘-identifies $9. It is, then, easy 
to convert M to a machine M’ such that M’ Aex’“-‘-“‘(“-“-identifies 
any fe 9. Since this is not possible, no such machine M can exist. fl 
[Theorem 61 
Similar proofs can be worked out for the following Theorems 7 and 8. 
THEOREM 7. 
(Vd,,d,,d3Id,>d3~O~dz+d,<1)[UAexd’-UApd*Aexd3#~]. 
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COROLLARY 2. 
(Vd,, dz, d3 1 d, > d, > 0 A d, + d3 < l)[UAexdl - UApdz UAexd3 # @I. 
THEOREM 8. (Vdl , dz 1 d, + dz < l)[Aex’- UApdl UAexd2 # $31. 
COROLLARY 3. (Vd < 1 )[Aex’ - Ap’ UAex” # 01. 
THEOREM 9. (Vd, > O)(Vd, < l)[UApdl Ex - Ap’ UAexd2 # 01. 
Proof of Theorem 9. Without loss of generality let dl =2/n and 
d2=(n-2)/n, where nEN. Let No=O, N,,+,=n’+‘+N,,, and Nzi+z= 
N2i+l+(i+l)*n. Let Sj=UkErm+CNz*(j,k>+,,N2r<,,k)+2). Note that 
here k ranges over N + and not over N. Consider the following class of 
functions: 
Let V = (fg 2 1 the following conditions hold: 
l.f(Ui,N CN,i> Nz,+1))=0 
2. tvj, -x)lICxESjl * Cf(x)=f(~)ll 
1 
It is easy to see that $7~ UApd’ Ex. Define 71 as follows: 
v(x) = 
0 XEUieN CN2i9N*i+l); 
t otherwise. 
Clearly, any program for q is a valid additional information for any 
f E k?. Suppose by way of contradiction that a machine M Ap’ UAexd2- 
identifies %‘. It is, then, easy to convert M to M’ such that M’ UAexcnPzMn- 
identifies 9. But by Theorem 5, no such machine M’ can exist. Thus, no 
such machine M exists. 1 [Theorem 91 
THEOREM 10. (Vd,, d2, d31d2 cd, r\d, < I)[Apdl Ex-Apd2 UAexd3#@]. 
Proof of Theorem 10. Without loss of generality, assume that d2 = l/n, 
d, = (I+ 2)/n, and d, = (n-2)/n, where Z, n E N, n > 3. Let No = 0, Nzi+ i = 
‘+l+NIi, 
lb 
and Nzi+*= N2i+l+(i+l)*n. Let Si=UkEN [N,.ci,kj, 
z + (j,k) + i ). Let Si = Sj n (X 1 x 3 I mod n >. Consider the following class of 
functions: 
Let %? = {fe %’ 1 the following conditions hold: 
l.f(fUi.. CN2i,&+l)Jn {xlx<lmodn})=O 
2. (Vi x,CC-yI - cf(x)=.f(~)ll 
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It is easy to see that % E Ap”’ Ex. Define q as follows: 
v(x) = 
0 Cx<lmodnl A CXEUieN CNzi, Nz+l)l; 
t otherwise. 
Since any program for q is a valid additional information for any ,f~ %‘, 
a machine M which Apd2 UAexd3-identifies % can be converted to a 
machine M’ which UAex’“- 2)‘“-identifies .%“. But by Theorem 5, no such 
machine M’ can exist. 1 [Theorem lo] 
Theorems 11 and 12 below can be proved similarly. 
THEOREM 11. (Vd, , d, 1 d, > d,)[UAexdl - A# UAexdZ # @I. 
THEOREM 12. 
(Vd,, d2, d3 ) d2 > d, A d, + d, < l)[ApdZ Ex - UApdi UAex” # 01. 
Results presented in this section give the complete relationship between 
different Ex, Aex, and UAex identification criteria formed with both Ap 
and UAp type additional information. 
4. LANGUAGE LEARNING 
4.1. Fundamental Language Learning Paradigms 
Definition 15 (Gold, 1967). A text for a language L is a mapping t 
from N into (Nu{#>) such that L is the set of natural numbers in the 
range of t. 
Intuitively, a text for a language is an enumeration of the objects in the 
language with #‘s representing pauses in the listing of such objects. For a 
finite initial segment CJ, content(a) = range(o) - { # } and 101 denotes the 
length of the finite initial segment 6, i.e., the number of elements in 0. t, t’ 
range over texts for languages. < denotes the initial segment of t with 
length n. CJ c t means 0 is an initial segment of t. Similarly CT _c 0’ means rs 
is an initial segment of c’. content(t) = range(t) - ( # }; intuitively, 
content(t) is the set of meaningful things presented in text t. 0, Oa, denotes 
the concatenation of CJ, and 02, i.e., 
cJ,Oo,(x) = 
{ 
a,(x) if x< la,l; 
@2(X - ICl I) if ~>,\a,\. 
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M(t)1 =i iff (V”n)[M(c)=i]. We write M(t)1 iff (3i)[M(t)l =i]. If L 
is a recursively enumarable language, then i is a grammar for L iff Wi = L. 
cr is in L iff content(a) S L. 
DEFINITION 16 (Gold, 1967; Case and Lynes, 1982; Osherson and 
Weinstein, 1982a, b) (a) M TxtExa-identifies an r.e. language L (written 
LeTxtExa(M)) iff for any text t for L, M(t)1 and IVMct) =‘L. 
(b) TxtEx”= {UGB((~M)[YLT~~E~“(M)]). 
DEFINITION 17 (Fulk 1985, 1990b). cr is a TxtEx-stabilizing segment for 
M on L iff content(a) EL and (Vrr’I content E L A CT E a’)[M(o’) = 
Wa)l. 
DEFINITION 18 (Blum and Blum, 1975; Osherson and Weinstein, 
1982b). cr is a TxtEx”-locking sequence for M on L iff CJ is a TxtEx- 
stabilizing segment for M on L and WMM(g) =a L. 
We often refer to TxtEx”-locking sequence by just locking sequence (a 
will be clear from context). We now present a very important lemma in 
learning theory due to Blum and Blum (1975). We will have opportunity 
to use this lemma on many occasions. 
LEMMA 1 (Blum and Blum, 1975; Osherson and Weinstein, 1982b). If 
M TxtEx”-identifies L, then there is a TxtEx”-locking sequence for M on L. 
Analogously to Bc-identification criteria in the context of function 
inference, we define a more general language learning criterion than 
TxtEx-identification. 
DEFINITION 19 (Case and Lynes, 1982). (a) M TxtBc”-iden@es an 
r.e. language L (written L E TxtBc”(M)) iff M, fed any text t for L, outputs 
over time an infinite sequence of grammars po,pI, pz, . . . such that 
(V”n)[ IV,” =(I L]. 
(b) TxtBc”= {2’~8~((3M)[mY~TxtBc~(M)]}. 
We usually write TxtEx for TxtEx’ and TxtBc for TxtBc’. 
Case (1988) considered the question whether humans converge to more 
than one distinct, but equivalent, correct grammars. He captured this 
notion through a new criterion of language learning, viz., TxtFex-iden- 
tilication-a more general criterion than Gold’s TxtEx-identification. We 
also study the effect of additional information on this criterion. 
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DEFINITION 20 (Case, 1988). Suppose M is a learning machine and 
t is a text. Then M(t) finitely converges (written M(t)&)= {M(a)1 UC t} 
is finite. If M(t)l,l then M(t) is defined= {pi (3”ac t)[M(a)=P]}; 
otherwise, M(t) is undefined. 
DEFINITION 21 (Case, 1988). (a) For bEN+ u {*}, a language 
learning machine, M TxtFexg-identifies an r.e. language L (written 
L~TxtFex;(M))e (V texts t for L)[M(t)U = a set of cardinality <b and 
(b’pWt))C~p=aL1l. 
(b) TxtFex; = (9 G B I(3M)[9 G TxtFex;(M)]}. 
In TxtFex~-identification, the b is a “bound” on the number of final 
grammars and the a is a bound on the number of anomalies allowed in 
these final grammars. A bou\nd of * on the number of anomalies (or the 
number of final grammars) means that the number of anomalies (or the 
number of final grammars) is finite, however the bound is not prespecilied. 
The following definitions are analogue of Definitions 17 and 18 for 
TxtFex and TxtBc identification criteria. 
DEFINITION 22 (Based on Blum and Blum, 1975; Case, 1988). Let 
a,bENu{*}. 
(a) o is a TxtFex,-stabilizing segment for M on L iff [content(a) 
EL] and there exists a set S of cardinality at most b such that 
(Wca)[S= {M(o”)(a’~a”co}] and 
S = {M(o”‘) I o G 0”’ A content(a”‘) E L). 
(b) cr is a TxtFexg-locking sequence for M on L iff 0 is a TxtFex,- 
stabilizing segment for M on L and (Va’I (T G 0’ A content c L) 
c Wrvl(d) =(I Ll. 
DEFINITION 23 (Based on Blum and Blum, 1975; Case and Lynes, 
1982). Let UENU {*I. o is TxtBc”-locking sequence for M on L iff 
content (a) c L and (Va’ 1 [a G a’] A [content G L])[ WMM(a,j =u L]. 
There is an analogue of Lemma 1 for TxtBc (Case and Lynes, 1982) and 
TxtFex (Case, 1988) learning also. 
LEMMA 2 (Based on Blum and Blum, 1975; Case and Lynes, 1982; Case, 
1988). Zf M TxtFexi-identifies L, then there is a TxtFexi-locking sequence 
for M on L. Zf M TxtBc”-identifies L, then there is a TxtJW-locking 
sequence for M on L. 
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Theorem 13 just below states some of the basic results in language 
learning. 
THEOREM 13. For all i, n E N, 
(a) TxtEx”+’ - TxtFex”, # 0; 
(b) TxfEx2” + ’ - TxtBc” # 0; 
(c) TxtEx2” c TxtBc”; 
(d) TxtFexy,, - TxtFex,* # 0; 
(e) U, TxtFex: c TxtFexT; and 
(f) U, TxtBc” c TxtBc*. 
Parts (a), (d) and (e) are due to Case (1988). Parts (b) and (c) are due 
to Case and Lynes (1982). Part (f) follows from part (e) in Theorem 1. 
Osherson and Weinstein (1982a) independently established that 
TxtEx c TxtFex, . 
4.2. Additional Information for Language Learning 
Formal language learning theory was originally motivated by the study 
of language learning in children. It relied on early claims of psycholinguists 
that children are rarely, if ever, informed of grammatical errors; instead, 
children are only exposed to strings in the language. Based on this, Gold 
(1967) developed the notion of TxtEx-identification. However, it turns out 
that the class TxtEx, which contains sets of r.e. languages that can be 
TxtEx-identified by some language learning machine, contains “small” 
classes of languages. For instance, none of the classes of languages in the 
Chomsky hierarchy (regular, context free, context sensitive, and r.e.) are 
contained in TxtEx. This led Gold to two possible conclusions. One was 
that the class of natural languages is much “smaller” than previously 
thought, and the other was that children are being given additional infor- 
mation in some subtle way. Angluin (1980a, b), Wiehagen (1977), and 
Klette and Wiehagen (1980) address the first conclusion of Gold. We will 
concern ourselves, in this section, with the second conclusion of Gold. 
It is not uncommon for an elder person (a parent or teacher) to tell a 
child some small grammatical rule that enables the child to enumerate a list 
of elements of the language. Basically, this additional information (the 
grammatical rule) enables the child to know certain elements of the 
language before these elements appear in the child’s text. This kind of addi- 
tional information can be modeled in Gold’s paradigm by requiring that, 
in addition to a text for the language, the language learning device be 
provided with a grammar for an infinite subset of the language. It turns out 
that such additional information indeed increases the language learning 
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power of learning machines. We further model the quality of this additional 
information by measuring the “density of agreement” between the language 
being learned and the subset language whose grammar is provided as addi- 
tional information. Not surprisingly, “better quality” additional informa- 
tion enhances the learning power of language learning machines more than 
“not so good” additional information. We now define this “density” notion 
and the new language learning criteria. 
DEFINITION 24. Let L, and L, be any two languages. Let x, <x2 < 
x3, . . . be the elements of Lz. 
The relative density of L, in L, (denoted rd(L,; L2)) is defined as 
follows: 
rd(L,; L2) = d({iIxi~Ll) If L, is infinite; 
d(L, ; 4 otherwise. 
Similarly, uniform relative density of L, in L, (denoted urd(L,; L2)) is 
defined as follows: 
urd(L,; L2)= 
ud((iIxiEL1)) If L, is infinite; 
WL,; L,) otherwise. 
DEFINITION 25. Suppose d is a real number in the interval [0, 11. 
(a) A language L’ is said to be d-language conforming with another 
language L iff L’ satisfies the following two conditions: 
(1) L’G L; and 
(2) rd(L’; L) 2 d. 
(b) A language L’ is said to be d-language uniform conforming with 
another language L iff L’ satisfies the following two conditions: 
(1) L’G L; and 
(2) urd(L’; L) > d. 
DEFINITION 26. Let dE [0, l] and ae(N u {*}). 
(a) A machine M Ap* TxtEx”-identifies an r.e. language L (written 
L E Apd TxtEx”(M)) iff M, fed any text for L and any grammar p such that 
W, is d-language conforming with L, converges in the limit to a grammar 
i such that Wi =(I L. 
(b) Ap*TxtEx”= {cY~~~((3M)[cYcApdTxtEx”(M)]}. 
We can similarly define UAp* TxtEx”, Ap*TxtFex;, UAp* TxtFex;, 
Ap*TxtBc”, and UAp*TxtEc” criteria of language learning. Clearly, these 
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criteria are analogs of the similar criteria for function inference. It should 
be noted that all the diagonalization theorems in function inference carry 
over to language learning case. 
Above, we were concerned with additional information that supplements 
the information a child is already receiving in the form of a text for the 
language. In other words, the additional information that we just modeled 
is about what is in the language and not about what is not in the language. 
However, literature of speech language pathology and linguistics contains 
extensive refutations of the claim that children receive no negative data 
(Brown and Bellugi, 1964; Dale, 1976). Intuitively, it is clear that children 
are receiving information about the complement of the language they are 
trying to learn. If a child’s utterances do not have the desired effect, it 
somehow works as a clue that the utterance is not in the language. An 
elder person (a parent or a teacher) either rebukes the child or tells it 
specifically that something is not in the language. Better still, an elder per- 
son can provide the child with a rule that enumerates a list of strings which 
are not members of the language. This kind of additional information can 
be modeled in Gold’s paradigm by requiring that the language learning 
device be provided with a grammar for a subset of the complement of the 
language being learned. It turns out that even this kind of additional 
information enhances the learning power of language learning devices. 
Fulk (1985) investigated a different approach to additional information 
about the complement of a language. He showed that being given a fext for 
a language L, and a grammar for the complement of L is equivalent to 
being given a text for L and an enumeration of a non-empty, finite 
sequence of grammars, the last of which is a grammar for the complement 
of L. However, we feel, a grammar for the complement of the language is 
too much additional information, and children certainly are not being 
given a rule that lists everything that is ungrammatical. We further employ 
the above density notions to differentiate “good quality” additional 
information about the complement from “not so good quality” additional 
information. As in the previous case, the better the additional information, 
the more is the enhancement achieved in the learning power of language 
learning devices. We now define this notion. In the following definitions 
ACp stands for Approximate Complement partial additional information. 
DEFINITION 27. Let de [0, 11. Let ~E(N u {*}). 
(a) A machine M ACpd TxtEx”-identifies an r.e. language L (written 
L E ACpdTxtEx”(M)) iff M, fed any text for L and any grammar p such 
that W, is d-language conforming with the complement of L (i.e., N -L), 
converges in the limit to a grammar i such that W, =n L. 
(b) ACpdTxtEx”= (9’c~I(3M)[c9~ACpdTxtEx”(M)]}. 
= { 22 E II (3M)[9 G Apd’ ACpd2 TxtEx”(M)] >. 
We can similarly define the following criteria of language learning. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
Apd’ UACpd2 TxtEx”; 
UApd’ ACpd2 TxtEx”; 
UApd’ UACpd2 TxtEx”; 
Apd’ ACpd2 TxtFex;; 
Apdl UACpd2 TxtFex;; 
UApdl ACpd2 TxtFex;; 
UApdl UACp” TxtFex; ; 
Apd’ ACpdZ TxtBc”; 
Apd’ UACpd2 TxtBc”; 
UApd’ ACp” TxtBc”; and 
UApd’ UACp” TxtBc”. 
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We can similarly define UACp” TxtEx”, ACpd TxtFexi, UACpd TxtFex;, 
ACpdTxtBc”, and UACp”TxtBc” criteria of language learning. 
Finally, we define a language learning criterion that incorporates addi- 
tional information both about elements of the language (positive informa- 
tion) and about elements of the complement of the language (negative 
information). It turns out that this kind of additional information is better 
than just providing positive additional information or just providing 
negative additional information. 
DEFINITION 28. Let d, , d2 E [0, 11, a E (N u (XC} ). 
(a) A machine M Apd’ ACp” TxtExa-identifies an r.e. language L 
(written L E Apdl ACpdZ TxtEx”(M)) iff M, fed any text for L and gram- 
mars pi and pz such that W;, is d,-language conforming with L and W,, 
is d,-language conforming with the complement of L (i.e., N -L), 
converges in the limit to a grammar i such that Wi =O L. 
(b) Apd’ ACpd2 TxtEx” 
All the results in function learning have a counterpart in language 
learning. The following theorems give results which are new to language 
learning. 
PROPOSITION 5. (VieN)[{LIL=‘+‘N}$TxtFex’,]. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose by way of contradiction that 
M TxtFex’,-identifies the above class. Let o be a TxtFex\-locking 
sequence for M on N. Let S be the set of grammars output by M on CJ 
LEARNING ANDPARTIALEXPLANATIONS 185 
which are at most i different from N. Thus, for any extension z of c, 
M(~)ES. Let T= {xI(3j~S)[x$ Wj]}. Clearly, T is finite. Let L be a 
language i + 1 different from f+J such that content(a) u TG L. Now, for all 
Jo S, Wj f’ L. Thus, M does not TxtFex’,-identify L. A contradiction. 1 
THEOREM 14 (Case and Lynes, 1982). (Vi E N)[{LIL =2if’ N) 4 
TxtBc’]. 
THEOREM 15 (Case and Lynes, 1982). {L ) L is finite or L = N } +! 
TxtBc *. 
THEOREM 16. For all k E N, 
(1) TxtExk+ ’ - UAp’ UACp’ TxtFexk, # /21; 
(2) TxtBck + ’ - UAp’ UACp’ TxtB& # 0; 
(3) TxtEx* - (Jk UAp’ UACp’ TxtFexk, # 0; 
(4) TxtBc - UAp’ UACp’ TxtFexS # @a; 
(5) TxtEx*“ + ’ - UAp’ UACp’ TxtBc“ # 0; 
(6) Ap”l ACp” TxtEx2k s Apdi ACpd2 TxtBck; 
(7) UApdl ACpd2 TxtExzk c UApd’ ACpd2 TxtBck; 
(8) ApdL UACpd2 TxtEx2k E Apd’ UACp”* TxtBck; 
(9) UApd’ UACpd2 TxtEx2k E UApdl UACpd2 TxtBck; and 
(10) Cw 4 UAp’ UACp’ TxtBc*. 
Proof of Theorem 16. (1) Let N,=O, N,i+,=N,i+n’, N3i+2= 
N3i+1+ni, and N 3r + 3 = Nji+ 2 + 1, n > 1. Consider the following class of 
languages: 
Y = {L E d 1 the following conditions hold: 
‘. UieN CN3i, N3i+ ljc L 
2.Ui~N CN3i+l~N3i+2)EL 
J.card@n CUi,N {N3,+2}l)<k+ 1 
>. 
It is easy to see that 5?eTxtExk+‘. Also, since grammars for 
L, = UicN [N,i, N3i+l) and L2= UicN [N3i+l, Nsi.2) are valid additional 
information of type UAp’ and UACp’, 2?~UAp’ UACp’ TxtFexk, o 
9’ E TxtFexk,. Suppose by way of contradiction that M TxtFexk,-identifies 
3. It is, thkn, easy to convert M to M’ such that M’TxtFexk,-identifies 
{LIL=k+’ N }. But this is not true (Proposition 5). Thus, no such M can 
exist. 
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(2), (3), and (5) can be proved similarly. 
(4) Let the Nfs be as defined in the proof of Part 1. Consider the 
following class of languages: 
2 = {L E d 1 the following conditions hold: 
l.UitN CN3irN3i+llGL 
2.UicM CN3r+19N3i+2)EL 
3. (vi)(3!j)CN3<i,j>+2E L1 
4.(V”i)CCN,,i,j,+*ELl~[Wj=L11 
It is easy to see that 2 l TxtBc. Also, 9 E UAp’ UACp’ TxtFexf o 
Y~TxtFex*,o{L’(L~2’}~TxtFex~, where L’= {(i,j)lN3ci,ij+z~L}. 
However, the proof of Bc-Ex* # @ in (Case and Smith, 1983) can 
easily be modified to show that {L’ 1 L E Y} 4 TxtFexz. Hence, 
3 $ UAp’ UACp’ TxtFexg . This proves 4. 
(6) This proof is the same as used in Case and Lynes (1982) to prove 
that TxtExZk E TxtBc“. Let M Apdl ACpd2 TxtEx*“-identify 55’. M’ can 
Apdl ACpd2 TxtB@-identify % as follows. M’ given p1 (as positive additional 
information), p2 (as negative additional information), and (r behaves as 
described below. Let 1~1 = s. Recall that as defined in Section 2, 
W~={x~s~~j(x)<s}. Let M, given p1,p2, and (T, output j. Let 
T= {xl XE WT- content(a)}. Let S be the set of k least elements of T 
(if card(T) < k then let S= T). Output p(j) where Wpcj, = Wju 
content(a) - S. It is easy to see that M’ Apd’ ACpdz TxtBck-identifies %?. 
This proves 6. 
(7), (8), and (9) can be proved similarly. 
(10) Let the Nis be as defined in the proof of part 1. For any 
language L, define L’ as follows: 
l*UicN CN3i9N3i+l)EL’ 
2’ UieN CN3i+l, N3*+2)GL 
3. (Vi)[ieLoN3i+2eL’]] 
Clearly, {L’ I L E S} E UAp’ UACp’ TxtBc* o &’ E TxtBc*. 
Since d 4 TxtBc* we have {L’ I L E S} $ UAp’ UACp’ TxtBc*. Thus, 
6 # UAp’ UACp’ TxtBc*. This proves the theorem. 1 [Theorem 161 
THEOREM 17. (Vd> O)[UApdTxtEx - Ap’ UACp’ TxtBc* # @I. 
Proof of Theorem 17 is similar to the proof of Theorem 18 below. 
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THEOREM 18. (Vd> O)[UACpdTxtEx - UAp’ ACp’ TxHk* Z 01. 
Proof of Theorem 18. Let NO=O, Ni(i+l)+,=Ni(i+,,+n’, Ni(,+lj+Z= 
Nici+l,+l +ni, Nl(i+l)+2+2j+l =Ni(i+l,+2+(2j)+ 1, and N,(i+1,+2+2j+*= 
Ni(i+l)+*+(2j)+l+ni, where j<i and n>l. Let Sj=UktNU,.,(j.k) 
{N<.i,k)*,<,,k>+I,+2+2/ }. Consider the following class of languages: 
3’ = {L E B 1 following conditions hold: 
l.‘JieN [IN,(;+I,,N,(,+I,+~)~L 
2.UitN CNj(i+1,+,,N;(i+l,+2)~L 
3. UicN Uj-ci CNi(i+1,+z+zi+l,N;(;+,,+*+2j+2)EL 
4.(vx,y,j)[[XESjA YESj]~[XEL"yEL]] 
5. { jl Sj E L} is finite or co-finite. 
It is easy to see that 9’ E UACpd TxtEx (since the additional information 
gives the text for the complement, and finite-cofinite languages can be 
identified on characteristic function input). 
Also, Y E UAp’ ACp’ TxtBc* o 9 E TxtBc*, and 2 E TxtBc* a 
{L ( L is finite or cofinite > E TxtBc *. But {L (L is finite or cofinite} $ 
TxtBc*. Hence, P’# UAp’ ACp’ TxtBc*. This proves the theorem. 1 
[Theorem 1 S] 
THEOREM 19. 
(Vd,, d2 1 d2 > d,)[Apd2 TxtEx - UApd’ UACp’ TxtBc* # 01. 
Proof of Theorem 19 is similar to the proof of Theorem 20 below. 
THEOREM 20. 
(Vd,, d, 1 d2 > d,)[ACpd2 TxtEx - UAp’ UACpd’ TxtBc* # 0-J. 
Proof of Theorem 20. Without loss of generality, let d, = i/n, d2 = 
(1+ 3)/n, n > 3, where Z, n E N. 
Let N, = 0. 
Forj<n’, i>O, let 
N z*(n’~l)/(n-l)+Zj+l =N**("i-1)/(,~1,+2j+n and 
N 2*(n’pl)/(n-1)+2j+2 =N2*(nl~I),(n~1)+2j+l +n'. 
Let sj= Uksb4 U ,<A.~) Ust(*,,<x<n) {N2r(n(,.k)~l)/(n~1,+2m+S). 
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Consider the following class of languages: 
Y = {L E d 1 the following conditions hold: 
l. UieN Ujcn’ CN 2*(n’-I)/(+l)+?i+l, N )=L 2*(n’-l)/(np1)+2j+2 - 
2. U;sN Uj<n1Ur<l (N2t(nl~l)/(n~l)+2j+r} GE 
3.(Vx,y,j)[[xESjA yESj]*[XELoyEL]] 
4. ( j 1 S, G L } is finite or colinite. 
1 
It is easy to see that 2 E ACpdZ TxtEx. 
Also, 9 E UApl UACpdl TxtBc* o 9 E TxtBc*, and .Y E TxtBc* a 
{L 1 L is finite or cofinite} eTxtBc *. But (L 1 L is finite or cofinite} q! 
TxtBc*. Hence, Y qi UAp’ UACp”l TxtBc*. This proves the theorem, 1 
[Theorem 201 
The above theorems give the complete relationship between different 
language identification criteria introduced in this section. We observe some 
of these relationships in Corollary 4 below which follows from results 
presented in this section, language learning counterparts of results 
presented in Section 3.2, and Theorem 13. 
COROLLARY 4. Let d,, d2, d3, d4E [0, 11. Let a, be N u (*}. 
(a) Apdl ACp” TxtEx” E Apd3 ACpd4 TxtExb o [d, < d, and d2 < d4 
and a Q b]. 
(b) Apd’ ACpd2 TxtBc” E Ap” ACpd4 TxtBcb o [d, < d3 and d2 < d4 
and a < b]. 
(c) UApdl UACpd2 TxtEx” E UAp” UACpd4 TxtExb o [d, < d3 and 
d2<dq and a<b]. 
(d) UApd’ UACpd2 TxtBc” G UApd3 UACp4 TxtBcb o [d, < d3 and 
d2<dq anda<b]. 
(e) (Vd, E (0, l])[Apdi ACpd2 TxtEx”c UApdl ACpd2 TxtEx”]. 
(f) (Vd, E (0, l])[Apd’ UACp” TxtEx” c UApdl UACpd2 TxtEx”] 
(g) (‘id2 E (0, l])[Apd’ ACp” TxtEx” c Apd’ UACpd2 TxtEx”]. 
(h) (Vd, E (0, l])[UApd’ ACpd2 TxtEx”c UApd’ UACpd2 TxtEx”]. 
(i) (Vd, E (0, l])[Apdl ACpd2 TxtBc” c UApdl ACpd2 TxtBc”]. 
(j ) (Vd, E (0, 1 ] ) [Apdl UACpd2 TxtBc” c UApdl UACpd2 TxtBc”]. 
(k) (Vd, E (0, l] [Apd’ ACpd2 TxtBc” c Apd’ UACpd2 TxtBc”]. 
(1) (Vd, E (0, l] [UApd’ ACpd2 TxtBc” c UApd’ UACp” TxtBc”]. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper was to take a first step in modeling the presence 
of partial explanations in learning situations, and to investigate the effect 
of such additional information on the learning capability of algorithmic 
learning devices. Two learning situations were considered: the practice of 
science modeled as the inference of programs for recursive functions and 
language learning modeled as the inference of type 0 grammars for recur- 
sively enumerable sets. It was shown, in both the learning situations, that 
the presence of partial explanation as additional information enhanced the 
learning capability of machines. Furthermore, certain density notions were 
used to model the quality of partial explanation, and it was shown, in the 
context of both the learning situations, that a better quality partial 
explanation enhances the learning capability of algorithmic learning 
machines more than a not so good partial explanation. 
Finally, we would like to state two shortcomings in this work which 
suggest obvious directions for further investigation. 
In the context of “scientific” inference of functions, our partial explana- 
tions do not contradict the function being learned. This is clearly a very 
simplistic model of partial explanation, as there is no reason to believe that 
the state of the art explanation available to a scientist makes no errors of 
commission. Hence, a natural line of further investigation would be the 
study of partial explanations that are correct on a set of a certain density 
and either undefined or incorrect off that set. 
Also, we would like to point out the ad hoc nature of approximate 
learning notions, as they are dependent on the choice of Godel numbering 
used in encoding the experiments and their outcomes. A particular 
encoding of experiments and experimental outcomes is presupposed when 
a recursive function is used to model a phenomenon. The density of the 
codes of a class of experiments for a phenomenon could change with the 
change in the encoding scheme used. For instance, consider the predictions 
of Aristotelian Physics on experiments in classical mechanics.’ There 
exists a Godel numbering of experiments for which Aristotelian Physics is 
correct on a set of density one, and at the same time there exists a Godel 
numbering of experiments for which Aristotelian Physics is correct only on 
a set of density of zero. Addressing this issue of the dependence of density 
notions on the choice of Giidel numbering used to encode experiments and 
experimental outcomes is an obvious future research direction. 
’ This example was pointed out to us by an anonymous referee. 
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